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TOTAL LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT 






Naval Special Warfare Group 4 (NSWG-4) provides Special Operations Craft Riverine 
(SOCR) and boat crews for operational use within Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM).  In this report, we analyze the logistics support provided for these craft.  We 
review the literature dealing with life cycle cost, life cycle management, operational 
availability, and repair kitting as they relate to the logistics support for the SOCR.  We 
create a model for determining required pre-staged inventories needed to maintain an 
objective availability for SOCR.  We also create a simulation to analyze the impacts of 
parameters affecting operational availability.  We use the literature review and data 
analysis to inform recommendations to improve logistics support for the SOCR. 
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1. System Description 
Naval Special Warfare Support Group 4 (NSWG-4) provides Special Operations 
Craft Riverine (SOCR) and boat crews for operational use within Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM).  NSWG-4 needs a craft with new capabilities, such as improved 
speed, weapons, and armor, that could be deployed quickly anywhere in the world.  The 
SOCR system is air transportable and replaced Vietnam-era craft.  This small, fast, 
armed, and armored combatant riverine craft is operated by a four-man crew and can 
insert and extract eight SEALS in a riverine environment. 
These craft are purchased by SOCOM under contract from United States Marine 
Incorporated (USMI) as a complete self-supporting weapon system.  In addition to the 
craft, the weapon system consists of trucks as prime movers, trailers, detachment 
deployable packages (DDPs), integrated logistics support, and shore-based spares (SBS).  
The DDP consists of an ISU-90 container stocked with a notional supply of spares and 
repair parts designed to support a SOCR detachment during a 90-day deployment.  The 
trailer, craft, and truck combination is capable of being loaded into C-130, C-141, C-17, 
and C-5 aircraft.  Special Boat Team 22 (SBT-22) operates the craft.  Figure 1 shows a 
SOCR detachment, which consists of two craft, two prime movers, two trailers, one DDP, 
integrated logistics support, two boat crews, and a maintenance support team (MST). 
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Figure 1.   SOCR Weapon System 
(SOCOM, 2002, p. 3) 
 
The SOCR is 33 feet long overall, with a 9-foot beam aluminum hull.  The craft is 
powered by twin turbocharged/aftercooled, six-cylinder marine diesel engines mounted 
side by side, with two water jets located on either side of the centerline.  The SOCR is 
provided with armor designed to protect against 7.62 mm x 39 mm rifle fire.  Table 1 is a 
summary of the SOCR characteristics. 
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Table 1.   SOCR Characteristics 
(SOCOM, 2002, p. 4) 
 
Nomenclature Characteristics 
Length, overall  33 feet 
Beam 9 feet 
Top speed  40+ knots 
Cruise speed  30+ knots 
Range at cruise speed & full load  195+ nautical miles 
Variable payload  4200 pounds 
Full load  19,000 pounds 
Armored load  20,500 pounds 
Fuel capacity  190 gallons 
Construction  Aluminum hull w/ FRP accessories 
Engines  
 
Yanmar 6LY2M-STE diesel, 440 HP @ 
3300 RPM 
Engine duty cycle  3300 RPM intermittent, 2850 RPM 
continuous 
Marine gears  ZF IRM220, 1.237:1 reduction 
Waterjets  Hamilton HJ-292 w/ 17 kW impeller 
 
2. Logistics Support 
NSWG-4 maintains several varieties of craft within their subordinate units, some 
of them supported by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and Naval Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP).  The SOCR currently is not supported by either the DLA or 
NAVSUP, and SBT-22, as the owning unit, must provide all logistics, administrative, and 
maintenance support for the SOCR.  When Department of Defense (DoD) service 
components purchase weapon systems through the normal acquisitions process, the DLA 
becomes the strategic-level logistics support activity.  The DLA maintains the 
relationship between the DoD and suppliers to ensure that logistics support is available 
and provided to the operational level of logistics.  At the operational level, which can be 
defined as theater/regional-level logistics, the service components must support the 
subordinate tactical commands.  In the case of NSWG-4, NAVSUP is the logistics 
activity responsible for providing operational logistics support.  Because the SOCR is not 
supported by the DLA, NSWG-4 must provide the tactical-level logistics outside of the 
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strategic and operational logistics support structure.  Figure 2 displays the direct and 
supporting relationship for logistics support. 
 
Figure 2.   Operational Chain of Command 
 
3. Maintenance Support  
Through interviews with the government representative and management at 
USMI, we also gathered information about the maintenance and support concept for the 
SOCR.  Maintenance for the SOCR is separated into two main categories: organizational 
level (O-Level) and depot level (D-Level).  SBT-22 is able to do corrective maintenance 
(CM) and preventive maintenance (PM).  USMI conducts the mid-life Service Life 
Extension Program (SLEP)—which is D-level maintenance—and they also perform 
programmed PM procedures that are scheduled for intervals which are six months or 
longer. 
a. Organizational-Level Maintenance 
The SOCR fielding plan (SOCOM, 2002) described the O-level 
















and corrective maintenance actions” (p. 17).  SBT-22 is responsible for all O-Level 
maintenance; however, provision has been made in the purchasing contract that allows all 
scheduled PM with intervals of six months or longer to be contracted out to USMI at the 
discretion of SBT-22 maintenance officers.  The craft follows a repeating 24-month PM 
schedule and is sent to USMI for PM every six months to complete required checks and 
services that are due. 
SBT-22 has the capability to fully support the maintenance requirements 
for SOCR weapon systems for O-Level maintenance.  As depicted in Figure 3, when 
deployed, SBT-22’s organic capabilities are the only resources available.  In garrison, 
SBT-22 performs PM and is responsible for emergent CM repairs. 
 
Figure 3.   SOCR Maintenance Structure 
(SOCOM, 2002, p. 18) 
 
USMI-scheduled maintenance is based on a fixed-price pay-as-you-go service 
contract for specified PM and CM.  Under this contract, there are fixed-price, menu-
driven, PM procedures in place for six months or longer that are specified and completed 
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by USMI.  When emergent CM is required, USMI provides a quote for cost on conditions 
found repairs as well as a fixed fee before receiving permission to conduct repairs.  
Conditions found encompasses any required maintenance that is identified during 
USMI’s comprehensive checks and services process.  Examples of conditions found 
repairs are dishing of the hull due to impacts in the water, CM of engine and drivetrain 
components found to be defective, or missing basic issue items.  In addition to—but 
outside of—this support contract, all major systems within the craft are covered by a one- 
to five-year warranty on manufacturer defects.  The contract for support with USMI is 
written by the SOCOM contracting office. 
b. Depot-Level Maintenance 
D-Level maintenance is described in the fielding plan as maintenance that 
“consists of overhaul and refurbishment of selected components and accessories (major 
engine overhaul, AN/APX-100 Transponder Set refurbishment, etc.), major repair actions 
(major hull repair, console replacement, etc.) and the accomplishment of directed 
maintenance actions such as Engineer Change Proposal (ECP) installation” (SOCOM, 
2002 p. 19).  The hull is designed to last for seven years, and between the three- and four-
year marks of its service life, a mid-life SLEP allows for a refurbishing of the hull along 
with all installed systems.  The SLEP takes 60 days on average, at a cost of $200,000 per 
craft on average. 
4. Deployment Support 
When riverine craft such as the SOCR deploy, they bring with them organic 
maintenance support called a MST.  These MSTs are part of the organizational structure 
at SBT-22 and are available for use during garrison operations.  In terms of training and 
equipment, NSWG-4 is capable of conducting maintenance up to major component 
replacement.  To facilitate short lead-time for PM and CM, DDPs are an integrated part 
of the SOCR weapon system package.  In these DDPs, there are pre-positioned parts 
based on anticipated need.  Historically, when riverine craft have been deployed to 
combat, extra craft have also been maintained to ensure a higher level of availability for 
missions.  For example, when SBT-22 deployed SOCR craft to Iraq, four craft were 
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required for operational commitments; however, six craft were deployed to theater.  If 
one of the operational craft becomes unserviceable, these additional craft are used until 
repairs can be conducted with parts from the DDP.  As a final option, an additional craft 
can be flown from inventory held in the continental United States (CONUS).  One 
additional option that is advertised by USMI, but has not been exercised, is tiger team 
support.  This would be used in a situation in which USMI provides a maintenance team 
to travel to the deployed location and conduct necessary repairs. 
5. Procurement of Materials 
a. Financial Accountability 
The procurement of parts for SBT-22 happens through funding passed 
from NSWG-4 to SOCOM through a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request 
(MIPR).  SBT-22 completes requisition requests for repair parts, which are sent to 
SOCOM for approval and then charged against the balance remaining on the MIPR.  This 
system puts the financial responsibility for the SOCR on NSWG-4 but the administrative 
oversight and approval authority for expenditures on SOCOM. 
b. Provisioning Order Items 
Because the SOCR is not supported by the DLA and because there is a 
high volume of purchase requests that are processed every year, there is a provisioning 
items order (PIO) list.  This list is generated once per year for all parts that would 
normally be line item provisioning items supported by the DLA.  The parts are 
competitively priced against competing vendors.  The price is then fixed for the period of 
one year.  USMI maintains these parts in inventory and then delivers the parts based on 
purchase requests received from SBT-22.  Because USMI has an open production line 
and ongoing service contract maintenance, they already maintain an inventory of the 
parts on the PIO.  They are able to provide the most competitive prices for these parts 
because they pass on their manufacturers’ discounted price to SBT-22, with a 3% 
administrative markup (Bunce, 2012).  Other vendors for these parts would normally be 
expected to charge a significantly higher profit margin. 
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B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to develop an understanding of logistics support 
provided for the SOCR under the current structure and to evaluate how this logistics 
support compares with best business practices and support models currently in use with 
the objective of providing recommendations, which will optimize availability given the 
resources applied.  We focused our research on the following four main areas: 
• developing an understanding of the current logistics structure, 
• identifying logistics concepts and models currently in use, 
• exploring models for providing logistics support currently in use and 
identifying as best business practices, and 
• providing recommendations for improving logistics for the SOCR and 
potentially for applying these models to other equipment in the DoD. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to provide recommendations to NSWG-4, we sought to answer the 
following research questions: 
• What are the current logistics concepts used in supporting the SOCR? 
• Is the current logistics support optimal? 
• What are alternative or improved logistics models that could be applied to 
the SOCR? 
D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
Through this research, we detail the current logistics structure for the SOCR, 
enabling management decision-making concerning risk and mission requirements.  We 
also identify recommendations that might be applicable to all low-density equipment not 
supported under the DLA or O-level logistics support activities.  The theoretical concepts 
applied and identified in this report will help decision-makers who plan logistics support. 
E. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
Life cycle cost encompasses cradle-to-grave cost.  In this project, we recognized 
these costs, but there are three main cost areas that we did not address: 
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• Costs that are too broad to address.  An example of this would be the cost 
of disposal.  Historically, SOCR have been disposed of through sales to 
other government agencies or foreign militaries.  Including these costs 
would require data and cooperation from multiple agencies, to include the 
State Department. 
• Other costs that have already been realized by the government and are no 
longer part of the decision-making process.  Research and development 
(R&D), test and evaluation, personnel, training, and acquisition costs 
have already been expended for this craft. 
• Costs for which there is insufficient data.  An example of this is mean 
time between failures (MTBF) for individual components.  For this 
reason, the MTBF must be imputed using analytical means and requires 
analysis at an aggregate level rather than an individual component level. 
The acquisitions process includes many different agencies, stakeholders, or 
players.  We did not address all of these players and how they interact; instead, we 
focused our attention on the interaction between NSWG-4/SBT-22 and USMI.   
F. METHODOLOGY 
This research was conducted by collecting data from NSWG-4, SBT-22, and 
USMI.  We collected both qualitative and quantitative data.  The qualitative data 
described the support structure in place and background information about the SOCR 
weapon system.  This data was focused on providing an overview and descriptive picture 
of the total life cycle (TLC) support for the SOCR.  The quantitative data was a two-year 
history of parts requisitions and maintenance support provided for the craft and historical 
readiness information.  This data allowed the application of theoretical models to the 
logistics support problem.  Through our research, we applied prior research from 
literature review and logistics support concepts to the SOCR. 
 10 
G. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
We have organized this report into five chapters.  In this first chapter, we have 
described the SOCR as a system and provided background on the current life cycle 
support for the SOCR.  The chapter has laid out the purpose for our research, the benefits 
we expected from the research, and the research questions that we intended to answer 
through this project.  Due to the complex nature of TLC sustainment, we also have 
discussed the limitations of our research. 
In Chapter II, we present a literature review of research pertinent to life cycle 
sustainment and the logistics support for the SOCR.  In this chapter, we review prior 
research dealing with Life Cycle Management (LCM), AO, logistics decision support 
systems (DSS), and repair kitting.  In addition, Chapter II provides an academic 
understanding of the concepts relating to the research questions. 
In Chapter III, we discuss research methodology, including what type of data we 
needed to gather in our research, how this data answers our research questions, what we 
were able to gather, and how the data applies to our analysis. 
In Chapter IV, we analyze the data in relation to best business practices and the 
current system being employed.  We use analytical methods in relation to the current 
practices and provide models for management decision-making. 
In Chapter V, we provide recommendations for the application of the logistics 
concepts and best business practices.  We also identify areas of further potential research. 
H. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we reviewed the SOCR program and the current logistics support.  
We provided a background for the program with a specific focus on the areas we 
analyzed in this project.  We stated the purpose of this research and the benefits it will 
provide.  We described the methodology we used in the research and the organization of 
the report.  In the next chapter, we discuss the academic concept and research pertaining 
to the areas we covered in Chapter I. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we discuss the academic concepts and research pertaining to our 
research questions.  We review in depth the concepts that we focus on in this MBA 
report.  Our literature review is purposely broad and includes many factors that contribute 
to Life Cycle Costs and other areas pertinent to the SOCR.  We use our literature review 
in development of a model.  Our model gives both cost and readiness for SOCR based on 
the concepts discussed in our literature review.  By keeping our literature view broad and 
creating a specific application in our model, other low-density systems can use our 
research to apply the model to their system. 
B. LIFE CYCLE COST AND TOTAL COST OF OWNERSHIP 
1. Introduction 
In Integrated Logistics Support Handbook, James Jones (2006) discussed cost of 
ownership and the key elements that factor into this important topic: 
The prediction of the total costs that will be incurred throughout the life of 
a system, or any other equipment, procured serves an important role in the 
acquisition process.  It is a valuable aid in making decisions about 
different options or alternatives related to the design characteristics of the 
system, the support infrastructure to support the system, and the physical 
resources required to operate and maintain the system.  The concept of 
cost of ownership is used to project the future financial obligations and 
liabilities that will be necessary to own the system.  The use of cost of 
ownership during acquisition focuses on total costs over the life of the 
system rather than just purchase price.  Supportability engineering uses 
various methods to predict cost of ownership during acquisition to identify 
significant issues that cause costs to rise so that these costs, and the factors 
that contribute to them, can be analyzed for determination of ways in 
which they can be reduced without lowering performance or operational 
availability. (p. 171) 
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2. Cost of Ownership 
Jones (2006) defined cost of ownership as “the total of all costs incurred to own 
and use a capability including research and development costs, acquisition costs, 
operating costs, support costs, and disposal costs” (p. 171).  Jones continued, “There are 
three basic concepts used by supportability engineering to estimate cost of ownership: 
Life cycle cost (LCC), through life cost, and whole life cost (WLC).  Each of these 
methods have different purposes and applications during acquisition” (p. 171).  Jones 
defined LCC as “a technical process which compares the cost of the relative merits of 
two or more options” (p. 171).  The Defense Acquisition University defined LCC as the 
“Total life cycle cost is the total cost to the government of acquisition and ownership of a 
system over its useful life.  It includes the cost of development, acquisition, operations, 
and support (to include manpower), and disposal where applicable.   
The DoD has directed that new acquisitions programs be evaluated using LCC.  
LCC includes development cost, production cost, operating and support cost, and 
program disposal cost (McArthur & Snyder, 1989).  By using LCC, both suppliers and 
government agencies are able to assess the full cost of ownership for a proposed program.  
This is particularly important for military acquisitions programs because budgets are 
approved on an annual basis; yet, unless the program is cancelled, the cost of an 
acquisition and sustainment will continue into future years.  With LCC, analytical 
techniques differentiate between those costs associated with procurement, such as 
development and production costs, and those that will be associated with sustainment, 
such as operating, support, and disposal costs (McArthur & Snyder, 1989).  Generally, 
procurement costs will be a near term investment and sustainment costs will be allocated 
over the useful life of the acquisition.  
Sustainment costs are also referred to as operations and support (O&S).  O&S 
costs are often the largest input for an LCC estimate.  For this reason, O&S estimates are 
of particular importance when designing a potential acquisition (McArthur & Snyder, 
1989).  An example of O&S would be fuel consumption.  If the Navy sets an upper limit 
on the life cycle cost of a new conventionally powered vessel, fuel consumption over the 
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lifetime of that vessel can be greater than the cost of building the vessel, especially if the 
vessel is intended for worldwide service.  For this reason, a supplier may make a design 
decision in order to meet the cost limits set by the Navy.  Since personnel, material, and 
facilities are all elements of O&S, it is easy to see that there are many variables operating 
under one cost constraint. 
When procurement is made without considering LCC, the buyer may not 
understand that the sustainment cost is likely to be two or three times the cost of the 
original purchase.  In addition, the cost drivers for sustainment may also be unknown.  
Purchases are made through the General Services Administration (GSA), not through the 
DLA.  Considering the benefits of knowing the LCC as well as the cost drivers, many 
institutions—both private and public—use a LCC approach.  LCC estimation is required 
by law and regulation when acquiring DoD major weapon systems. 
Ferrin and Plank’s 2002 article, “Total Cost of Ownership Models: An 
Exploratory Study,” states that TOC data is not readily available.  What is available is 
TLC support information that addresses responsibility and procedures for the support of 
the SOCR but not the associated LCC involved.  This makes the information available for 
the SOCR craft normal rather than abnormal, in terms of Ferrin and Plank’s (2002) 
article.  Military procurements that go through acquisitions programs can be classified as 
capital goods in the private sector (purchases that would be capitalized and depreciated 
over time).  In Ferrin and Plank’s (2002) survey, only 28.8% of respondents indicated 
that they used TOC estimates.  Many of the responses indicated that they try to use TOC 
but “believe they are struggling in their attempts to use TOC valuation logic in supply 
management, or at best doing an average job” (p. 24).  Ferrin and Plank (2002) further 
identify the reason these firms are struggling: because of the difficulty in determining 
TOC cost drivers.  If a firm is not able to accurately determine the drivers, or if the 
drivers are too complex, a firm may not feel confident in the estimate.  Another challenge 
to identifying cost drivers is the open-ended nature of the estimate; there is not a defined 
list of cost drivers to calculate, which can lead to omission of large cost drivers or a large 
quantity of smaller cost drivers, which, in aggregate, account for a large amount of TOC. 
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These open-ended cost drivers are demonstrated in the responses that Ferrin and 
Plank (2002) received; “A total of 73 responses generated a list totaling 237 cost drivers, 
with individual respondents providing between one and six cost drivers” (p. 24).  With so 
much variation in response, Ferrin and Plank (2002) sought to categorize all the cost 
drivers and came up with 13 main categories. 
Ferrin and Plank (2002) concluded that TOC is a very difficult process for a firm.  
It is easy to see that there are large benefits for firms able to conduct TOC; therefore, 
firms “are making significant efforts at TOC valuation” (Ferrin & Plank, 2002, p. 28).  
They also concluded that the large variation in cost drivers, as well as the way they are 
categorized, makes it very unlikely that a standardized model for TOC can be made.  A 
standardized model is further complicated by variation from industry to industry. 
In Ellram and Siferd’s (1998) article “Total Cost of Ownership: A Key Concept in 
Strategic Cost Management Decisions,” they identified the means in which different 
firms determine their cost drivers for TOC.  They also identified that data availability is a 
common challenge for all firms.  Firms develop automated systems, establish common 
cost information, or create teams to gather data from suppliers, manuals, and automated 
systems (Ellram & Siferd, 1998). 
In this section, we discussed the complexity of calculating TOC and the 
importance of TOC as it relates to private firms.  For the DoD, calculation of LCC is 
mandated in law through the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and the 
means of LCC determination are directed by law.  Operational costs are estimated as 
costing 60-85 percent of a typical DoD system.  Our discussion of TOC as it relates to 
Ferrin and Plank (2002) and Ellram and Siferd (1998) emphasizes that the challenges of 
accurate LCC calculations are not unique to DoD. 
For the SOCR, we have identified only operational costs as the relevant costs for 
this project because the government has already absorbed the development and 
purchasing costs and those costs cannot be changed at this point.  Likewise, the disposal 
costs are an obligation made at the purchase of the SOCR, so disposal costs are not 
germane to NSWG-4’s decision processes.  By using cost drivers in determination of the 
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O&S costs, NSWG-4 will be able to determine activity cost.  Additionally, these cost 
drivers will contain data useful in determining material support needed for the SOCR. 
3. Life Cycle Cost Categories 
The DoD 5000.4 manual, Cost Analysis Guidance and Procedures (Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense [Program Analysis & Evaluation], 1992), defined LCC 
categories to use when viewing LCC.  These categories are research and development, 
investment, operating and support, and disposal.  Jones (2006) further defined the 
categories of TLC phases as the following: concept, assessment, test and select, design 
and manufacture, operation, and disposal. 
Research and development includes costs for all research and development, from 
program initiation through the full-rate production decision.  During this research and 
development phase, acquisition managers must predict the cost of ownership.  Jones 
(2006) discussed this and referred to it as “presystem acquisition stage.” 
In terms of this project, the research and development/presystem acquisition 
stage, as well as the investment stage has already occurred.  We focus on the operating 
and support category.  With that said, understanding the research and development and 
investment stages are important to fully understand the TLC cost of the SOCR. 
The bulk of LCC occur in the operating and support category.  It is important to 
look at direct costs within the operating and support category.  This category was the 
most significant for our focus within this project.  Jones (2006) defined direct costs as 
follows: “Any cost that has a direct relationship to the operation or support of a system is 
considered a direct cost” (p. 174).  Jones (2006) emphasized that costs for personnel and 
training are an important direct cost. 
Movements of the SOCR to include the craft itself, as well as the parts necessary 
to maintain it, are direct costs.  Jones (2006) stated, “Packaging, handling, storage, and 
transportation costs include all movements of the system due to operation or maintenance 
needs after initial delivery, and the movement of spares and repair parts between 
maintenance facilities, supply facilities, and the user” (p. 176). 
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Lastly, an important direct cost that we addressed in this project is engineering 
costs with relationship to militarizing the maritime craft to fit the needs of the user.  Jones 
(2006) defined these costs as “All engineering changes and other modifications to the 
system that occur after deployment are direct O&S costs.  Modification costs are 
considered sustaining investment costs that are necessary to enhance the reliability, 
maintainability, supportability, or operational capabilities of the system” (p. 175). 
A final category within the LCC is disposal.  Jones (2006) stated, “A cost element 
that is often ignored is the cost of disposing of a system as it becomes obsolete or is 
replaced.  In some instances, the equipment may have salvage or resale value which may 
offset the cost of disposal[;] however, costs can be incurred” (p. 176). 
Within this project, demilitarization may occur.  Jones (2006) defined 
demilitarization as “the act of rendering an item useless for military purposes.  
Government regulations require that certain classes of items be demilitarized before 
disposal.  If the system being disposed of requires such actions, then the costs are accrued 
as disposal costs” (p. 176).   
Jones (2006) summarized the steps within understanding LCCs in terms of what 
percentage of cost of ownership goes into each phase: 
The actual cost of ownership of every system is different and may vary 
greatly; however, the ratio between R&D, investment, O&S, and disposal 
for most system[s] tends to be similar.  This similarity has been the subject 
of many studies.  The general consensus of these studies suggests that, for 
an average system, 2 percent of cost of ownership occurs during R&D, 12 
percent during investment, 85 percent during O&S, and 1 percent during 
disposal.  These studies also suggest an even more important point, that is, 
when decisions are made the[y] effect cost of ownership. (p. 176) 
Figure 4 illustrates some of the unseen items that go into total cost visibility.  
Again, we addressed some of these items in this project and not others.  It is important to 
try to estimate all possible items that contribute to the total cost of the SOCR’s life cycle. 
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Figure 4.   Total Cost Visibility 
(Blanchard, 2004) 
 
In this section, we discuss the life cycle cost categories addressed by private 
firms.  For DoD systems, the Office of Secretary of Defense has provided guidance in the 
Product Support Manager Guidebook (2011) for identifying areas that will be used for 
estimating support requirements.  The Product Support Manager Guidebook identifies 
these areas as the 12 Integrated Product Support Elements.  These elements are intended 
to be inclusive of the life cycle cost categories identified in Jones (2006). 
C. LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT 
1. Integration and Optimization 
With regard to President Barack Obama’s approval of the Fiscal Year 2010 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; 2009), and especially Section 805, Life 
Cycle Management and Product Support, Kobren (2010) argued that the government 
again addressed the importance of keeping cost down while meeting the warfighters’ 
readiness demand.  The legislation states that “every major weapon system shall be 
supported by a product support manager (PSM)” and that the Secretary of Defense shall 
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issue a “comprehensive guidance on life-cycle management and the development and 
implementation of product support strategies for major weapon systems” (Kobren, 2010, 
p. 1). 
By establishing a PSM, the new legislation focuses on desired performance 
outcomes, and reduces product support costs (Kobren, 2010).  However, in order to 
optimize logistics support cost by reducing TOC, and in the attempt to meet required 
readiness and system availability, several LCM principles must be adopted.  Besides 
important areas such as system reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM), 
Kobren (2010) also included the following areas to be considered by the PSM for major 
weapon systems: 
• application of systems engineering processes,  
• designing with supportability in mind, 
• long-term sustainment planning, 
• aggressive root cause analysis and failure resolution, 
• proactive obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources and 
material shortages mitigation, and 
• planned technology upgrades. 
 
Further, the new legislation facilitates LCM because it covers the flow from 
acquisition through operation and sustainment to disposal of the weapon system (Kobren, 
2010).  Therefore, LCM is not a single operation but focuses on integration and 
optimization between the several stages and levels of the weapon system to satisfy the 
objective readiness level.  Further, integrating sustainability in the planning and 
management of the acquisition and production phase, throughout the termination of the 
weapon system, is important and will lower the LCC. 
2. Cost and Performance Integrated in the Design Phase 
During the design of Gripen Fighter Aircraft, the Swedish aerospace industry and 
the Swedish Air Force took advantage of a unique relationship and established an early 
focus on availability performance and life support cost (LSC), with the goal of both 
building high-performance aircraft and achieving cost effectiveness.  The designers 
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defined availability performance “to be dependent on reliability (low failure rate), 
maintainability (easy to repair quickly if necessary), and supportability (logistic resources 
in the form of spares, equipment and personnel at the right place at the right time)” 
(Sandberg & Stromberg, 1999). 
According to Sandberg and Stromberg (1999), future operation and support costs 
increase if these costs are not considered in the early acquisition phase decisions.  In the 
early phases, the foundation for the weapon system is established, and as time goes by, 
the opportunities for lowering the LCC while also reaching a high availability 
performance are significantly reduced.  Failure to focus attention on operation and 
support cost in early phases results in increased LCC throughout the system's operating 
life. 
In designing the Gripen Fighter Aircraft, the Swedish Air Force’s contract with 
the aircraft producer included logistics parameters defining information over future 
support, operational cost, and available performance (Sandberg & Stromberg, 1999).  
These parameters were the following: 
• failure rate; 
• maintenance workload on all levels (organizational, intermediate, and 
depot); 
• mission success probability; 
• downtime per flight hour (in a wartime scenario); 
• turnaround time (at O-level); and 
• LSC, including those elements significantly affected by changes in the 
technical or support system, as follows: 
• investment in support equipment, 
• investment in spares, 
• annual cost depending on maintenance personnel, and 
• annual cost for consumables. 
This contractual agreement between the Swedish Air Force and the maker of the 
Gripen Fighter Aircraft serves as an example in the early acquisition phases for other 
weapon systems. 
 20 
With regard to the design phase for the Gripen Fighter Aircraft, the contract 
statement of work established the following: 
• Requirements breakdown and allocation—defines the maintenance 
requirements from customer needs with the purpose to allocate 
maintenance performance and design criteria to vendors and technical 
design areas. 
• Design review, maintenance aspects—requires continuous involvement 
with the design department and vendors to ensure that maintenance and 
test criteria are met. 
• Maintenance needs analysis—defines the need for corrective and PM that 
is required to retain airworthiness during the operational life of the 
aircraft.  Includes also identification of significant maintenance items, 
maintenance task analysis, and definition of maintenance intervals for PM. 
• Test methods—defines and specifies the total test and registration needs of 
the aircraft.  
• Maintenance resource requirements—for identification, analysis, and 
recommendation of all the maintenance resources required to support the 
aircraft throughout the life cycle.  The resources include technical 
publications, training level/personnel recommendation, support equipment 
including tools, facilities, spares, etc. 
• Logistics analysis—includes LSC analysis, maintenance-level analysis, 
repair/discard analysis, and various availability performance calculations, 
including reliability, maintainability, and supportability (R, M & S) trade-
off analysis (Sandberg & Stromberg, 1999). 
By including these works in the design phase, the manufacturer managed to 
achieve higher availability performance while at the same time lowering the LSC for the 
Gripen Fighter Aircraft, which could be a good methodology for other weapon systems 
(Sandberg & Stromberg, 1999). 
During the operational phase, the Gripen Fighter Aircraft was also monitored and 
evaluated to achieve better availability performance and lower LSC.  Statistical and 
operational data was collected and stored in an information system linked with the 
manufacturers.  By constantly monitoring the performance metrics, adjustments and 
changes were planned in a cost-effective way (Sandberg & Stromberg, 1999). 
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3. Classification of Parts Due to Priority 
For several weapon systems, spare parts are classified by different attributes, such 
as how critical or essential they are to the operation and mission; these attributes indicate 
the importance of the specific part to the system (Deshpande, Cohen, & Donohue, 2003).  
Storing parts often leads to conflicting goals, and the trade-off between holding and 
inventory cost, as opposed to readiness, is a well-known dilemma. 
The study on DLA by Deshpande, Cohen, and Donohue (2003) indicated that cost 
was the dominant performance driver, not criticality or essentiality.  In their study, 
Deshpande, Cohen, and Donohue (2003) recommended classifying parts into different 
priority categories depending on the service level required for different parts, giving 
higher service levels to the most critical parts.  Service level is the probability that a 
given part will not be available in inventory given average demand and variability in 
demand.  Deshpande, Cohen, and Donohue (2003) claim that setting different service 
levels on different parts can be accomplished without a significant rise in inventory cost. 
  
4. Commercial Items in Weapon Systems 
The use of commercial items in weapon systems has been a clear focus for the 
DoD, due to the expected reduction in weapon system life cycle cost.  Some weapon 
system programs have included commercial items at the component level, and others 
have used commercial items in the whole program.  Often, programs have used 
commercial items with some modification to tailor them to specific military requirements 
(Meyer, 2001). 
Procuring commercial items for use in weapon systems could be beneficial in 
different ways but might also raise some challenges.  The program managers are not 
controlling the development of the item; rather, the marketplace is responding to 
customers’ demands.  In the marketplace, the DoD is often a small customer for 




accordingly, this again can have a negative impact on the TLC.  Moreover, commercial 
items must be tested and evaluated after potential modifications and changes (Meyer, 
2001). 
During a study of different issues regarding the acquisition of commercial items 
in the DoD, Meyer (2001) found several challenges that program managers need to be 
aware of.  For instance, improper identification of user requirements might lead to 
procurement of a product that does not meet exact military specifications, which can also 
be the consequence of an improper market investigation.  Further, lack of risk analysis 
and improper test and evaluation often have a negative impact on the TLC cost, and 
performance, reliability, and maintainability data might not correlate to a military 
application or meet required levels for military use.  In general, mistakes and 
unawareness in procuring commercial items might cost more than predicted, in terms of 
both time and money, and reduce the availability of the weapon system (Meyer, 2001). 
D. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY 
1. Introduction 
So far in history, mankind has not been able to construct an eternity machine; 
every system fails at some point.  However, most systems can be repaired or fixed given 
a period of downtime.  One definition of availability is “the probability that an item is in 
an operable and committable state when called for at an unknown (random) time” (Jones, 
2006), and availability can be predicted and measured. 
Reliability can be defined as “the probability that a system or product will 
perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time used under specified 
operating conditions” (Blanchard, 2004).  The MTBF is the average length of time 
between the system failures and is related to the failure rate, λ, as follows:  MTBF = 1 / λ.  
When a system or component fails, it will not be available for operational use, and the 
time until it is repaired or fixed is called the mean downtime (MDT).  This is the average 




non-mission capable time (NMCT).  The mean time between maintenance (MTBM) 
includes both corrective and preventive maintenance, whereas MTBF only consider how 
often a system or item fails.  
The operational availability (AO) can be expressed as the following: 
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In Equation 3, MTBMu (same as MTBF) is the mean interval of corrective 
maintenance and MTBMs is the mean interval of PM.  Further, fpt (=1/ MTBMs) is the 
frequency of the PM action per system operating hour.  
Further, the MDT can be divided into mean corrective time (MCT) and mean 
preventive time (MPT).  MCT can be expressed by the following formula, where MCMT  is 
the mean corrective maintenance time: 
 𝑀𝐶𝑇 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠  × 𝑀𝐶𝑀𝑇 (4) 
In other words, MCT first estimates the number of critical failures per year and 
then calculates the time in terms of CM when the system will not be available (Jones, 
2006).  MPT is a product of the number of PM events, average PM event frequency, and 
average time it takes to perform a PM event. 
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In addition, administrative and logistics delay time (ALDT) has an impact on the 
MDT, meaning that the MDT includes both active maintenance and logistics delay.  The 
ALDT is a result of the following factors: 
• spares availability, 
• support equipment availability, 
• personnel availability, 
• maintenance facility capacity, 
• transportation/shipping time, and 
• administrative delay time (Jones, 2006).  
 
The AO is the commonly used readiness measure for weapon systems (K. Kang, 
personal communication, June 22, 2012) and can be improved by addressing the 
following targets: 
• reliability—mean time between critical failures (MTBCF), 
• maintainability—mean time to repair (MTTR), 
• testability—diagnostics, 
• scheduled maintenance requirements, 
• logistics support infrastructure, 
• spares availability, 
• support equipment availability, 
• personnel availability, 
• facility capacity and utilization rate, 
• transportation responsiveness, and 
• administration requirements (Jones, 2006).  
 
2. Improvement on Component Level: Impact on Operational 
Availability 
One of the ways to reduce LCC, while at the same time improving the AO, is 
using performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts, in which the vendor is responsible for 
meeting certain performance criteria for the specific weapon system.  The organization 
sets these performance criteria, and the mission value of a logistical service can be seen 
 25 
as a function of weapon-system performance (Kang, Boudreau, & Apte, 2005).  One way 
to measure the weapon-system performance is to monitor the AO, because AO measures 
the percentage of the weapon systems (e.g., aircraft in a squadron) that are mission-
capable at any given time. 
There are often several subsystems and components that can be improved.  
Improvement of a component AO within a system can improve the AO for a weapon 
system as a whole; however, an increase of the AO for one specific component doesn’t 
necessarily improve the weapon system AO by the same percentage of the component 
improvement.  An improvement on the component level must be related to the 
performance of other related parts.  Kang, Boudreau, and Apte (2005) recommended that 
the use of different spreadsheets and discrete-event simulation models can act as a 
decision support model for managers in terms of estimating the AO of a weapon system 
based on the component-level reliability and maintainability data (Kang, Boudreau, & 
Apte, 2005).  Their discrete-event simulation models were used to show how a change or 
improvement in one or several components can affect the overall AO for the weapon 
system, and calculate the individual cost associated with the specific component 
improvement.  Hence, this methodology can be valuable for the decision-maker in 
determining which improvement initiative at the component level has the greatest impact 
on the AO for the weapon system. 
3. Logistics Impact on Operational Availability 
The study Impact of Logistics on Readiness and Life Cycle Cost: A Life Cycle 
Management Approach at the Naval Postgraduate School demonstrated possible positive 
relations between certain logistical parameters and AO using simulation and modeling 
tools (Balafas, Krimizas, & Stage, 2010).  In the study, Balafas, Krimizas, and Stage 
(2010) used the light armored vehicle equipped with a 25-mm gun system (LAV-25) to 
estimate how AO, readiness, and TLC cost are related by running different scenarios in a 
model.  Although it is a simplified model Balafas, Krimizas, and Stage believe it can be 
applied to other military systems with some minor adjustments.  
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Balafas, Krimizas, and Stage’s (2010) study showed that the best way to improve 
AO was to improve the fourth-echelon maintenance turnaround time (TAT), which also 
had the biggest impact on the readiness risk.  Further, the study concluded that an 
increased MTBF in combination with reduced TAT had a significant positive impact on 
LCC as well.  Moreover, Balafas, Krimizas, and Stage (2010) also found that increasing 
the inventory of spare parts only, and not reducing the TAT, does not have a significant 
impact on the AO and readiness risk but only increases the LCC. 
E. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
1. Introduction 
Over time, people have developed a variety of systems to make their decisions 
easier, both in private life and in the business world.  In terms of acquiring a weapon 
system, several decisions have to be made on different levels and at different stages.  
Often there are complex situations with several factors that need to be evaluated and 
considered before these decisions are made.  Cost-benefit analysis and net present value 
calculations are examples of approaches to ease some of these decisions.  Some systems 
are also designed to make decisions, such as automated processes where human 
interaction is not needed. 
A decision support system (DSS) is exactly what it is called—a system to support 
decisions, not make decisions.  Computer-based systems are designed to handle several 
different parameters and factors and to provide a simplified set of target values, which 
decision-makers can take into consideration.  By populating the system with available 
data, the respective programs show how the outcomes differ as input changes. 
Reducing life cycle support cost while maintaining the desired readiness level is a 
challenge for logisticians.  For many weapon systems, O&S cost normally covers the 
major cost for a system, although initial cost, like acquisition cost, and disposal cost, also 
have an impact on the TLC cost.  One of several ways to reduce LCC is to utilize the 
available logistic management DSS.  There are different types of DSSs for different 
weapon systems and organizations. 
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Using a DSS, managers simulate different changes and observe how changes in 
different factors have an impact on the overall system AO.  The DSS might also reflect 
how different changes relate to the total cost for the system.  Managers therefore often 
have to evaluate improved AO against cost, when different parameters are changed in 
their models and DSS. 
2. Logistics Management Decision Support System 
Trade-offs between readiness and cost are common for most weapon systems, and 
the challenge is to find the best combination, often described as affordable readiness.  
Affordable readiness is the level of readiness in the weapon system that the budget 
constraints allow it to meet and sustain.  Flexible sustainment, sustained maintenance 
planning, right sourcing, and TOC are different ways to approach the support of a 
weapon system (Dizek, n.d.).  Moore & Snyder (1998) lists six areas within O&S cost 
that relate to affordable readiness: maintenance concept, inventory, manpower, technical 
data, infrastructure, and warranties.  Further, ownership cost is another term used, which 
is a component of manpower, infrastructure, and materials.  Savings within these areas 
must be evaluated in relation to availability and reliability of the relevant weapon system 
(Moore & Snyder, 1998). 
According to Moore and Snyder (1998), a Logistics Management Decision 
Support System (LMDSS) must meet certain criteria to be an effective DSS.  An LMDSS 
must meet the data management and dialog management component criteria.  Further, it 
has to include a modeling and sensitivity analysis capability.  Additionally, an LMDSS 
should provide enough information and statistics to enable users to analyze logistics 
areas.  The data quality must be high in terms of accessibility, consistency, and validity.  
An effective LMDSS can be a valuable tool for managers to identify areas for reduced 
life cycle support cost. 
3. Total Life Cycle Management–Assessment Tool 
As an example of another DSS, the U.S. Marine Corps has used the Total Life 
Cycle Management–Assessment Tool (TLCM–AT) to control LCC and maintain their 
required readiness level, and it has proven to be an effective decision support tool.  The 
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TLCM–AT combines operations, maintenance, and logistics and gives an overall picture 
of the LCC for the weapon system (Young, 2008).  Further, the TLCM–AT also has a 
model structure and organization that let decision-makers run different models and what-
if scenarios to evaluate the way that different changes impact the LCC in the long term.  
Moreover, studies show that implementing the concepts of data farming and design of 
experiments and Java programs could enhance the TLCM–AT capabilities in terms of 
analyzing LCC (Young, 2008). 
4. Closed-Loop, Simulation-Based, Systems Engineering Approach 
One definition of LCM is “a management technique which bases programmatic 
decisions on the anticipated mission-related and economic benefits derived over the life 
of a weapon system” (Connors, Gauldin, & Smith, 2002).  To be able to plan for future 
logistics and engineering support, decision-makers must know the characteristics of the 
weapon system and be able to run simulations to determine which improvements have the 
most impact on the LCC for the system while at the same time meeting required 
readiness.  Quantifiable data and proper analyses of the weapon system are requirements 
for supporting management decisions.  
Connors, Gauldin, and Smith (2002) define life cycle analysis (LCA) as “a formal 
process for establishing a quantitative basis in support of LCM decisions.  LCA consists 
of: (i) building a model representation of a real world system or process, (ii) obtaining 
data to populate or instantiate the model, (iii) using the populated model to predict future 
behavior—e.g., performance and costs—for a range of defined system designs or use 
scenarios, (iv) validating the model predictions, and (v) presenting the analysis results to 
decision makers” (pp. 1-2).  The main costs for a weapon system and performance drivers 
can be divided into the following segments: 
• operations and maintenance (O-, I-, and D-level), 
• management, 
• engineering, and 
• supply/logistics. 
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The LCA of a weapon system is designed to quantify these segments of the 
system, and LCM has a goal to optimize and control the same system segments (Connors, 
Gauldin, & Smith, 2002). 
Additionally, there can be several different LCA models within the DoD, as 
follows: 
• supply models; 
• level of repair analysis models; 
• reliability, availability, and maintainability models; and  
• LCC models (Connors, Gauldin, & Smith, 2002). 
Often these models are used independently on different levels within the 
organization and can have impacts on each other’s input and output.  LCA in segments, 
rather than as a whole, might have an adverse impact on the quality of the results because 
the related impacts and possible interfaces between segments might be lost or missed.  
Clockwork Solution has developed a tool called Aviation Total Life-Cycle Analysis 
Software Tool (AT-LAST), which takes the segmented approach to LCA into 
consideration and focuses on a closed-loop, simulation-based, systems engineering 
approach to LCA (Connors, Gauldin, & Smith, 2002).  The closed-loop, simulation-based 
model integrates operation, maintenance, supply, and other relevant factors and estimates 
a more reliable and true picture of the system.  The Clockwork Solution simulation 
models can be utilized in several logistics-related areas for the subject weapon system, 
which can improve the AO. 
5. Weapon System Management Information System 
Another DSS available for logistics managers is the Weapon System Management 
Information System (WSMIS), which “is designed to give logistics managers a better tool 
to prioritize their task to meet required readiness” (Tripp et al., 1991).  An important 
factor for the WSMIS was to identify measures for the logistics areas that are directly 
related to AO and performance goals.  For instance, the number of available aircraft at a 
given point for a specific war scenario could be such a measurement (Tripp et al., 1991).  
To support a given scenario with logistics, managers need appropriate data to support 
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operations plans involving numbers of flying hours or other operational factors.  More 
important, the variation within each of the segments over the time period of the 
operations is vital for logistics planning. 
The WSMIS is designed to capture when a wartime sortie is at risk and trace that 
risk back to specific resource shortages or other logistics shortfalls.  Further, the WSMIS 
can distinguish between planned and actual logistics support capabilities.  The WSMIS 
was designed to have the following capabilities: 
• to predict the availability rates of weapon systems for any scenario as a 
function of existing logistics resources and current process performances; 
• to project the specific logistics resources, identified down to the specific 
problem part, most likely to limit the attainment of particular goals; 
• to provide a list of problem items and processes so that decision-makers 
could develop solutions; and 
• to provide each decision-maker with a sensitivity analysis capability so 
that he or she could determine the effects of alternative plans for 
improvement before implementing a solution (Tripp et al., 1991). 
The WSMIS was developed over time in incremental steps, and both senior Air 
Force officers and members of the RAND staff developed the philosophy and framework.  
The Air Force Logistics Command implemented the WSMIS systems in the 1980s to 
estimate the logistics impact on the potential wartime capabilities. 
F. REPAIR KITTING 
1. Deployment Kitting 
When NSWG-4 deploys one of its craft in support of Navy SEAL teams, they 
must send with it a crew and maintenance capability.  Once deployed, NSWG-4 will not 
see this craft again until it returns.  As part of the SOCR weapon system, a DDP is 
deployed with every two craft.  This DDP is intended to provide parts for expected 
corrective and PM during a given deployment period.  Mamer and Smith (1982) 
developed a model in their paper “Optimizing Field Repair Kits Based on Job 
Completion Rate.”  The model was for service call–type processes in which repair part 
inventories were required to make repairs.  This is a very similar concept to the DDP, 
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except that SOCR deployments have a longer deployment period than a typical service 
call–type repair.  Mamer and Smith (1982) recognized the relationship between the cost 
of holding inventory and the cost of “broken jobs.”  A broken job would be defined as 
 
any job in which a maintenance task is attempted, but due to inadequate spares or 
equipment, there is additional downtime while required resources are procured or 
delivered. 
Because of this relationship, Mamer and Smith (1982) created a model that nested 
broken job cost within inventory cost to create an optimization model for repair kits.  
They treated job completion rates in a similar manner to a fill rate for inventory.  They 
also correlated part failures and requirements with repair procedures to allow for pooling 
of part inventories for multiple procedures, which lowers the risk of not having parts on 
hand that are used for multiple procedures, thus allowing a lower inventory level with the 
same service level. 
2. Kitting with Variation in Broken Cost Penalty 
Mamer and Smith’s (1982) model treated all broken jobs as having the same cost.  
In reality, there is not an equal penalty for every broken job.  For this reason, March and 
Scudder (1984) addressed this point in their article “On ‘Optimizing Field Repair Kits 
Based on Job Completion Rate.’”  In their work, March and Scudder (1984) 
acknowledged that it is very difficult to find the exact penalty a firm will pay for a broken 
job, but they proposed that by finding a range for penalty cost, the model can be 
improved. 
3. Improved Kitting Model 
Mamer and Smith (1985) again addressed the issue of optimization for repair kits 
in their article “Job Completion Based Inventory Systems: Optimal Policies for Repair 
Kits and Spare Machines.”  In this article, they improved on the optimization process by 
including spare machines.  This is a very important concept that applies directly to 
NSWG-4’s maritime craft.  When the craft deploy, NSWG-4 doctrine dictates that the 
repair kit must be capable of providing maintenance supplies for a period of 90 days, 
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which is referred to as a knapsack model.  A ground rule of the knapsack model is that 
resupply is not possible; therefore, the optimum combination of supplies must be 
included within the resource constraints.  Any supplies placed in the knapsack that are 
not used will incur a disposal cost.  The knapsack reference comes from the idea of 
packing supplies in a knapsack for a day hike.  If you put your winter jacket in the sack, 
you will have no room for other items such as food.  The decision-maker must then make 
decisions on which items are the most important because some items will be left behind.   
The reason for requiring 90 days of supply for deployments is that resupply is 
often very difficult at the beginning of deployments, and the variance in lead-time is very 
high or unpredictable for parts ordered.  With the inclusion of spares components in 
addition to repair kits, the risk of having a broken job is lowered.  If the kit is not 
sufficient to complete the repair, then the spare will be used and a new one will be placed 
on order.  In Mamer and Smith’s (1985) article, they discussed machines, but on 
maritime craft, machines would be substituted by major components such as outdrives or 
engines.  Some repairs are so infrequent that parts are not included in the knapsack 
model, so having a spare component would provide coverage for all of these low-
frequency jobs without stocking large quantities of low-usage repair parts.   
In some cases, it is the likely that component failures are not independent of each 
other.  An example of this could be a seawater pump on a boat.  These pumps remove 
seawater to cycle through a heat sync, which cools the engines.  Because the pumps are 
prone to fail over time, they are replaced at regular intervals.  In the case of structural 
failure of the pump in between PM intervals, it is likely that the pump’s failure will be 
discovered after the engine overheats and other damage has occurred.  Because of this 
correlation, it is easy to imagine a situation in which a water pump kit is included in the 
knapsack, but parts for the correlated damage due to overheating, such as head gaskets, 
are not included.  Ultimately, Mamer and Smith (1985) demonstrated that it is the service 
level for job completion that should be focused on.  By adding machines—or, in the case 
of maritime craft, by adding major assemblies—job completion can be raised 
significantly, especially in cases where there is a catastrophic failure, as is sometimes the 
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case when component failure is correlated.  In the case of engine failure due to pump 
failure, the replacement engine would be available and there would be no broken job. 
When considering a knapsack model, it is likely that cost is not the primary 
concern for optimization for NSWG-4.  For private industry firms that go on repair jobs, 
their exposure period is relatively short.  The exposure period for a craft on deployment is 
long, and additional resources are far away.  On deployment, space is constrained to one 
ISU-90 container, so space is a proxy for cost for NSWG-4. 
4. Repair Kitting in Application 
Although much of the repair-kitting research was conducted in the early 1980s, 
there are examples in which these concepts are still relevant and the benefits are 
demonstrated.  Gorman and Ahire (2006) wrote the article, “A Major Appliance 
Manufacturer Rethinks Its Inventory Policies for Service Vehicles,” which demonstrated 
that service-kitting optimization improves the job completion rate for appliance repair 
technicians during first-time visits.  In their research, Gorman and Ahire (2006) found 
that a major appliance company operated a central repair parts warehouse.  From this 
central location, four regional warehouses were serviced.  The regional warehouses, in 
turn, serviced technicians who conducted repair calls from service vehicles.  This 
company identified that it was very important for their customers that the appliances be 
repaired on the first visit.   
Further, this company used a simple aggregation measuring the frequency of part 
usage to determine what should be put in the repair vehicles.  Gorman and Ahire’s (2006) 
research averaged one-year’s usage of repair parts.  The approach Gorman and Ahire 
(2006) took to optimization differed from Mamer and Smith’s (1985) model because 
Gorman and Ahire assumed that there was independence in part failure.  They did include 
cubic space constraints, repair part lead times, replenishment periods, and inventory 
carrying costs.  Their conclusion showed that both high demand and small parts should 
be included in their model.  The reason for this was the low cubic cost of keeping small 
parts, in comparison to the high cost of a broken job if that part is not on hand (Gorman 
& Ahire, 2006). 
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Gorman and Ahire’s (2006) study is very applicable to our research with NSWG-
4’s maritime craft.  For the SOCR, there are high levels of complexity and interdependent 
parts that makes them different from appliances.  For this reason, NSWG-4 would have to 
analyze their craft like Mamer and Smith (1985) recommended in their model.  When a 
repair must be conducted, NSWG-4 must assume that there is an array of parts that will 
be needed.  At the same time, because these craft will be deployed, space is at a premium.  
NSWG-4 should then look at their problem in the same terms as a repair truck (which 
conducts a repair without resupply) and balance high-frequency parts with low-volume 
parts.  Although March and Scudder (1984) pointed out that not all broken jobs have the 
same penalty, in the case of NSWG-4, a vessel that cannot be used for any reason carries 
the same penalty.  For this reason, any model used by NSWG-4 can be simplified to 
include one penalty for any broken jobs.  Finally, we can see that the risk that NSWG-4 is 
exposed to will be greatly improved if they stock major assemblies.  Additions of major 
assemblies have a high space premium, so their inclusion should be weighed by the 
frequency of failure. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we discuss the methodology we used to conduct our research.  
This includes the data we collected, the data questions that we asked, and the process we 
used to analyze the data. 
B. METHODS USED IN DATA COLLECTION 
1. Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data required for our project describes the SOCR system and the 
logistics support structure.  We gathered qualitative data from government literature and 
doctrinal publications for the SOCR and SBT-22.  In addition, we interviewed personnel 
at NSWG-4 and SBT-22, as well as conducting a tour of operations at both locations.  
Further, we visited and interviewed personnel at Navy Surface Warfare Center, Combat 
Craft Division (NSWCCD).  This unit supports the Riverine Assault Boat (RAB).  The 
RAB is an almost identical craft to the SOCR and is also manufactured by USMI. 
2. Quantitative Data 
We were able to get a two-year history of all parts procured through USMI for the 
SOCR, as well as the objective inventory levels for the SBS and DDPs from SBT-22 
Supply.  We got quantitative data on AO for each of the SOCR currently in service since 
their date of manufacture from historical management reports used by SBT-22.  Because 
the RAB is an analogous system, we collected one year’s worth of purchases by 
NSWCCD, which we used to compare the support of these two systems under different 
logistics models.   
C. DATA COLLECTION QUESTIONS 
1. System and Components 
At the highest level of data collection, we needed to determine what the system 
and its components were.  This allowed us to determine which components are parallel 
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and which are serial.  Parallel components serve the same function as each other and the 
system can operate with only one of them operational, such as two engines in the same 
craft; however as serial component is reliant on other components in the system to be 
operational in order for them to also operate, such as the propulsion system which is 
reliant on the engine.  Through interviews with USMI, the government representative to 
USMI, and SOCR maintainers, we collected qualitative data that enabled the 
determination of the major components within the SOCR. 
The SOCR has two power generators, which are Yanmar 6LY2-STE diesel 
engines.  Although the engine is a system in itself, with parallel and serial components, 
we treated it as one of the single major components for two reasons. 
First, most of the components in a single engine are serial components; if one 
fails, the entire engine is inoperable.  For those components that are not serial, there is a 
high correlation factor involved.  For example, the starter, alternator, and water pump are 
all serial components; the pistons, fuel injectors, and valves are all parallel components.  
Although these engines will still operate if a valve or piston fails, the performance will be 
degraded and the strain on the rest of the engine greatly increases the likelihood of 
catastrophic failure of the engine.  Once the engine is degraded, it is highly likely that the 
craft will not be employed, and if it is already on a mission when failure of these parallel 
components occurs, it could result in termination of the mission for that craft. 
The second reason for treating the engine as a single component is that it is very 
easy to replace the engine.  The DDPs each contain one spare engine and the craft was 
specifically engineered to make replacement of the engine very simple. 
An IRM 220 PL Marine gearbox is in line with the engine and transfers power to 
the drive system.  Like the engine, the components of the gearbox are serial, so any 
failure should be treated as a gearbox failure. 
Each engine and gearbox drives a Hamilton HJ-292 Water Jet propulsion system.  
These water jets draw water into an impeller and provide the forward thrust for the craft.  
They are aligned and operate parallel to each other.  Because each engine drives a single 
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water jet, the engine, gearbox, and water jet are a serial system.  Likewise, since the craft 
can be propelled with only one water jet, each of these systems is parallel to each other. 
The hull is another main component.  The failure of the hull will cause all other 
components in the SOCR system to fail.  Hull failure is very rarely catastrophic to the 
system.  Although there have been impacts that have compromised the hull, they are very 
rare and are typically due to underwater impacts or battle damage.  These failures should 
be controlled with operational decisions rather than logistics decisions.  The elements 
within the hull that are more likely to cause system failure are the hydraulic and electrical 
systems installed to control the craft. 
The final component in the SOCR system is government-furnished equipment 
(GFE).  This equipment consists of everything outside the actual craft and its drive train.  
Examples of this component are the prime mover (F550 truck), trailer, radios, radars, 
guns, and navigation system.  We treated GFE as a single component for the purpose of 
acknowledging them.  GFE is not furnished by USMI and is not within the logistics 
structure for supporting the SOCR.  In addition, most GFE is interchangeable between 
the SOCR and is supported by traditional Navy logistics. 
Figure 5 shows the SOCR system based on the data we gathered.  Having this 
diagram will allow for a determination of the SOCR system reliability, component 
reliability, and sensitivity analysis on each component, which will enable logistics 
decision-makers to achieve objective readiness. 
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The formula for system reliability that we used in our data analysis is depicted in 
Equation 5 and is derived from the data in Figure 5. 
[ ][ ]{ }1 1 ( 1)( 1)( 1) (1 ( 2)( 2)( 2) ( )( )R WJ GB E WJ GB E H G= − − −   (5) 
2. Operation Availability (AO) 
What operational availability is being achieved for the SOCR is a key question we 
sought to answer through our data collection.  By answering this question, we were able 
to establish a model that will enable logistics managers to make the decisions needed to 
achieve any given objective availability. 
The formula for AO is depicted in Equation 6.  By focusing our data collection on 
the elements in the AO formula, we were able to detail the levers that management has 
available in order to meet their objective availability.  For the SOCR, USMI has not 
calculated or tabulated MTBF for the SOCR and the major components; however, there is 
a maintenance schedule, which is based on industry standards set by manufacturers of the 
engines and jet propulsion systems.  Through our data collection, we were able to get 
data on historical AO based on maintenance records, CM times, and PM times.  PM is 
split between O-Level and D-Level.  USMI conducts all D-Level maintenance.  
                      ( )
o
MTBMA
MTBM MCT MPT ALDT
=
+ + +    (6)
 
Based on this data, during our analysis, we were able to extrapolate the MTBM 
based on the known values from our data.  We also conducted a what-if analysis to 
determine the sensitivity for each of the manageable elements within this model. 
3. Inventory Service Level 
One of the main elements that can be managed in the AO formula to meet a 
desired availability is the ALDT.  This is the time spent waiting for administrative 
logistics processes to be completed and the shipping of materials needed for completion 
of maintenance.  One way to mitigate the impact of ALDT is to pre-stage the parts 
needed for maintenance, as proposed by Mamer and Smith (1985).  As part of the SOCR 
weapon system, a pre-staged inventory is included in the form of SBS and DDPs. 
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Our data collection enabled us to get a listing of all retail parts ordered for the 
SOCR for a two-year period.  During our analysis, we used analytical statistics to find the 
service level provided by the SBS and DDPs.  In addition, we determined an objective 
inventory amount for a given service level. 
Given that specific service level, we make recommendations that will bring the 
ALDT closer to zero.  For example, if there is a 90% service level, nine out of 10 
maintenance jobs can be immediately completed without any ALDT.  One job in 10 
would not have needed parts, and the ALDT would be the mean lead-time for those parts.  
When put together, the ALDT would be weighted between the completed jobs and the 
broken jobs. 
D. ANALYTICAL PROCESS 
In Chapter IV, we use inferential statistics to make a determination of service 
level for inventories.  We conversely use analytical methods to determine inventory 
levels required to meet desired service levels.  Finally, we present a model that will 
enable decision-makers to adjust their inventory policy based on historical data. 
We use analytical methods to analyze the AO for the SOCR.  We explore the 
levers of control that decision-makers have available to affect the AO.  We also conduct a 
sensitivity analysis on those levers to demonstrate the impact they have on AO.  This 
sensitivity analysis is useful in gauging the effort required to achieve objective AO. 
We analyze the SOCR as a system to create a model used to analyze sensitivity 
and identify which components have the greatest impact on AO. 
Finally, we analyze all these areas in relation to deployment of the SOCR.  The 
unique nature of a deployment means a vast increase in ALDT for material support and 
the possibility that there will be no means of distribution to deployed SOCR. 
E. SUMMARY 
In these first three chapters, we have discussed the existing SOCR system, the 
TLC support being provided for the SOCR, and the data we have gathered to support our 
research.  This discussion has provided a background understanding and vision for our 
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research analysis.  In the final two chapters, we conduct an analysis based on the data we 
have gathered and provide recommendations for logistics support to the SOCR, as well as 
potential further research. 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we describe the results of our analysis.  We focused on the service 
level found in prepositioned inventory and the protection level they provide SBT-22 for 
maintenance procedures.  We did this by calculating the objective inventory level 
required to meet desired service levels set by management. 
We analyzed the operational availability of the SOCR craft based on actual 
historical availability data.  We used the parameters of the reliability computation to 
analyze the impact each of these has on availability.  We simulated availability based on 
known variations in the parameters. 
B. SBS AND DDP 
1. Overview 
The SBS and DDP both serve as prepositioned inventory with the intent of 
reducing administrative logistics downtime for maintenance procedures.  The inventories 
for both the SBS and DDP were developed by USMI and are periodically updated on an 
annual basis.  The main difference between the SBS and DDP is their intended use. 
The SBS is used for garrison maintenance operations and is never deployed.  The 
SBS was purchased as an initial spares requisition during procurement and is intended to 
support 10 craft.  There are two SBS, and each SBS is maintained in a separate container, 
co-located at SBT-22.  The SBS inventories are consolidated inventories supporting a 
demand from 24 craft. 
The DDP is used only for deployment purposes.  One DDPs inventory is designed 
to support two craft for 90 days since the SOCR is deployed in pairs.  The use of DDPs is 
exclusively reserved for deployment, and they do not contribute to garrison maintenance, 
even if parts required for repairs are present in the DDP but not the SBS. 
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2. Data Collection 
We collected data from SBT-22, which gave us a 24-month history of parts usage 
for both CM and PM.  This data included quantities of parts procured and the year in 
which they were procured.  What was not differentiated in the data was whether the parts 
were used for CM or PM. 
We received data on objective inventory levels for both the SBS and DDPs.  
These inventories were listed in the same part number format as the parts requisitions 
data.  In addition, we received the latest PIO, which included all the parts necessary to 
maintain the SOCR regardless of whether they had been procured before. 
3. Spares Model 
To help us understand the data we collected, we created a spares model.  With this 
model, we sought to consolidate and analyze the data to answer the following: (1) what is 
the mean demand, (2) based on the mean demand, what should the desired inventory 
quantity be set at, (3) what is the current service level for both the SBS and DDPs, and 
(4) what is the estimated value of pre-staged inventory with a comparison between 
current and recommended inventories.  A depiction of our spares model is included in the 
appendix of this report. 
4. Objective Inventory Level 
Objective inventory is the quantity of spare parts on hand that must be maintained 
in order to achieve the required service level.  To determine the objective inventory, we 
assumed a Poisson arrival.  The time between arrivals for a Poisson process is 
exponentially distributed.  In the model, we set the probability of experiencing a stock-
out of inventory and the model returns a quantity needed in the inventory to achieve the 
desired probability of not stocking out.  Because we do not know what decision-makers 
at SBT-22 would establish as acceptable risk, we made the model so that any probability 
can be used as an input, and objective inventory levels are adjusted based on that 
probability.  For our base example, we have set the DDP at 95% and the SBS at 85% 
service level. 
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In order to create our model, we first had to calculate the parameters in 
determination of objective inventory quantity to meet the required service level.  These 
inputs were the average number of failures and the service level required.  Management 
will set the service level.  The average number of failures, however, has several 
components.  The formula to determine the average number of failures, µ, is 
1 HC L
MTBF T
µ     = × × ×    
    
                             (7) 
C: # of craft 
H: operating hours over two years 
T: time, which is two years’ historical data (365 × 2) 
L: lead-time or repair turnaround time (in days) 
 
Our sample population of data included parts demand over a two-year period 
across all craft owned by SBT-22.  For this reason, we normalized our other data based 
on this two-year period.  To find the hours of use for each craft, we used the SBT-22 
engine hour report.  This report lists total accumulated hours of use for each engine 
installed on SBT-22 craft.  By matching this report with the date each craft was put into 
service, we determined that the average annual usage for each craft was 165.98 hours 
with a standard deviation of 52.54 hours.  Once we calculated average boat hours, we 
were then able to find the MTBF for parts by dividing two years’ boat hours by two 
years’ average demand per craft for each part. 
Because the DDP was for a 90-day deployment without resupply, we used a 90-
day lead-time.  The DDP is designed to support two craft.  By using a Poisson table, we 
were able to determine the objective inventory level needed to maintain the desired 
service level.  Our model includes a macro to make this calculation based on a Poisson 
distribution table and input parameters, i.e., the average number of failures and the 
desired service level. 
Both the DDP and SBS are reviewed annually.  Because we used a sample, the 
results of our model were more accurate when the sample size was larger.  Each year’s 
demand can be added to the database, resulting in outputs that are more accurate over 
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time.  These outputs can then be used to make adjustments during the annual review.  In 
order to conduct a proper review, however, it is also important to know what protection 
the current inventory level (also referred to as the current service level) provides. 
5. Service Level 
The service levels provided by parts maintained in the DDP and SBS inventories 
are calculated through Poisson distribution.  Our model used the Cumulative Poisson 
Distribution Table to look up the probability of having more demand than inventory 
levels will support.  If there is more demand than can be supported with inventory, it will 
result in a stock-out. 
To use our model, the input parameters that will be needed are the failure rate for 
each part over lead-time and the quantity of parts on hand in inventory.  We used the 
mean demand over lead-time calculated in our previous section as the failure rate, λ, and 
the inventory levels from the data we collected as our number of parts on hand.  With 
these two values, our model returned the probability of greater demand than our 
inventory could withstand.  Since there are requisitions for parts that are not included in 
the DDP or SBS, there is no protection level for these parts, so we created a logical 
argument in our model to indicate this status by returning a “No-Protection” status in the 
service level field.  We also created a logical argument that returned a status of “None” 
when parts had no demand and lacked on-hand inventory.  Further, our model did not 
distinguish between critical and non-critical parts.  There may be some parts listed as 
having “No-Protection” that are not critical to the readiness of the SOCR.  An example of 
our model outputs is seen in the appendix of this report. 
6. Inventory Consolidation 
The SOCR program designates two craft per DDP and ten craft per SBS.  For the 
purpose of setting up our model, we made the assumption that there would not be any 
inventory consolidation.  This is not the case functionally because the SBS are co-located 
and all of the SOCR are in the same location.  For this reason, the actual coverage level 
realized by SBT-22 is the same as having two consolidated SBS inventories servicing 24 
SOCR.  It is useful to realize that the actual service level will be higher than our model 
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showed, but we built our model based on two independent flights of 10 SOCR in order to 
model the system as the SOCR program is designed. 
We did not calculate the impact of consolidating the DDPs in our model.  The 
reason for this is because of the nature of DDP inventories.  DDPs are not used unless a 
craft is deployed, and typically, the craft are deployed in pairs.  For this reason, the most 
likely scenario would be that of an unconsolidated inventory. 
7. Effects of Lead-Time 
In our model, it was imperative that we consider the impact of lead-time on our 
service level.  When setting up our model, we determined that all parts in the DDP would 
have a lead-time of 90 days.  The reason for this is the 90-day deployment period that the 
DDP is designed to support.  In reality, the lead-time would be, at most, 90 days 
assuming an order was placed on the first day of a deployment.  With the SBS, we 
assumed a 30-day lead-time, but this was an arbitrary number that we picked.  Currently, 
USMI has an active production line for the SOCR and allows SBT-22 to order parts from 
their inventory.  Since USMI is located less than a two-hour drive from SBT-22 and 
maintains the SBS inventories for SBT-22, there is, at most, a seven-day lead-time for 
parts.  This lead-time is only achieved because USMI allows SBT-22 to use their 
inventory.  When the production line is no longer active for the SOCR, it can be expected 
that the lead-time for replacement parts will increase. 
Lead-time has a large effect on the service level for repair parts.  Our model 
allows users of the model to change the parameters of lead-time and desired service level.  
As an example, when we lowered the lead-time for SBS items to seven days, we found 
that there are no parts that are not within an 85% required service level.  Likewise, for 
this same service level of 85%, the required spares for all parts included in the SBS were 
reduced from 912 to 213 when lead-time was reduced to seven days.  The current 
inventory for SBS spares includes 2,456 parts. 
 46 
8. Job Completion 
To this point, we have discussed the service level based on the need for individual 
parts.  Mamer and Smith (1982) discussed the optimization of field kits based on job 
completion.  With repair jobs, we know that there is a low likelihood that only one part 
will be required.  Instead, there are a series of parts needed to complete the job, and each 
one of these parts has its own service level.  In addition, some parts are common to more 
than one type of job.  Our data did not differentiate between demands based on the type 
of job that was being completed, so we can assume that the failure rate for each 
individual part is the sum of the failure rates for all completed jobs requiring that part. 
When looking at service level from the perspective of job completion, it is the 
product of all the individual parts’ service levels needed to complete the repair job that 
determines the overall job service level.  This is because the job will have to wait until 
the last part arrives before it can be completed.  The service level (SL) for the job is  
1 2... nSL P P P= × ,        (8) 
where Pn is service level of the nth part required in a repair kit. 
Mamer and Smith (1982) identified a job that cannot be completed with pre-
staged inventory as a broken job.  For the SOCR, the pre-staged inventory is the SBS or 
the DDP.  If a job cannot be completed and is broken, there is an additional cost incurred 
by having to wait the entire period of the lead-time in addition to the extra time spent 
returning to the job.  When making quantity decisions on pre-staged inventory, each of 
the critical repair jobs must be identified as well as the kit of parts needed to complete the 
job.  The required spares level for each of the parts must then be set to enable an 
acceptable service level for the entire job. 
C. OPERATIONAL READINESS AND RELIABILITY  
1. Overview 
The purchasing contract for the SOCR is for 48 craft, which were scheduled to be 
delivered over 15 years; however, SBT-22 is only entitled to maintain an inventory of 20 
craft according to their table of organization and equipment.  In addition to the 20 craft 
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required, SBT-22 expanded the allowable inventory of the SOCR to 24 with the intent of 
increasing the quantity of fully mission-ready craft.  Without any service life extension, 
each craft has a service life of seven years.  The weapon system program is scheduled for 
15 years (2002–2017). 
The objective for this section is to analyze the factors affecting the operational 
availability for the SOCR in order to enable management to make decisions regarding 
readiness.  We will use a decision support tool to conduct what-if analysis, and then we 
will apply a Monte Carlo simulation to the readiness formulation in order to determine 
the parameters within which actual operational readiness may occur. 
2. Data Collection 
SBT-22 provided a “SOCR Monthly Engine Hour Report” dated July 2012, which 
showed the hours used per engine for all craft currently in service.  Further, SBT-22 
provided a “Progress, Status and Management Report (Covering Period July 01-31, 
2012),” which stated the in-service date for the SOCR, by which we could calculate the 
number of days that the craft have been in service.  We matched that data with engine 
hours per craft to find average engine hours used. 
3. Readiness: Operational Availability 
 For the SOCR, we evaluated readiness using AO.  AO can also be 
expressed as a relationship between total hours, CM downtime, and PM downtime: 
 




           (9) 
 
Equation 9 states the ratio between how often, in terms of days, the weapon 
system is serviceable, and the total number of days in a given time period.  For the 
SOCR, the total time for the weapon system is the average operational hours per craft per 
year, which is calculated in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Engine Hours Report 
Craft Date in Svc Date of Rpt Days of Svc Yrs of Svc Hrs Annual Hrs
SOCR 01 8-Feb-02 31-Dec-07 2152 5.896 518 87.86
SOCR 02 27-Mar-02 31-Dec-07 2105 5.767 799.3 138.60
SOCR 03 11-Oct-02 31-Dec-07 1907 5.225 941.8 180.26
SOCR 04 11-Oct-02 31-Dec-07 1907 5.225 956.6 183.09
SOCR 07 22-Feb-03 31-Dec-07 1773 4.858 748.3 154.05
SOCR 08 22-Feb-03 31-Dec-07 1773 4.858 889.4 183.10
SOCR 09 11-Jul-03 31-Dec-07 1634 4.477 749.2 167.35
SOCR 10 11-Jul-03 31-Dec-07 1634 4.477 749.8 167.49
SOCR 11 27-Feb-04 31-Dec-07 1403 3.844 590.3 153.57
SOCR 12 27-Feb-04 31-Dec-07 1403 3.844 417.7 108.67
SOCR 13 11-Jun-04 31-Dec-07 1298 3.556 744.1 209.24
SOCR 14 11-Jun-04 31-Dec-07 1298 3.556 769.7 216.44
SOCR 15 17-Sep-04 31-Dec-07 1200 3.288 460 139.92
SOCR 16 17-Sep-04 31-Dec-07 1200 3.288 578 175.81
SOCR 17 14-Jan-05 31-Dec-07 1081 2.962 366 123.58
SOCR 18 14-Jan-05 31-Dec-07 1081 2.962 306 103.32
SOCR 19 6-May-05 31-Dec-07 969 2.655 347 130.71
SOCR 20 6-May-05 31-Dec-07 969 2.655 250 94.17
SOCR 21 16-Feb-07 31-Jul-12 1992 5.458 1092.6 200.20
SOCR 22 16-Feb-07 31-Jul-12 1992 5.458 565 103.53
SOCR 23 17-Oct-08 31-Jul-12 1383 3.789 924.7 244.05
SOCR 24 17-Oct-08 31-Jul-12 1383 3.789 1116.2 294.59
SOCR 25 6-Mar-09 31-Jul-12 1243 3.405 652.3 191.54
SOCR 26 6-Mar-09 31-Jul-12 1243 3.405 406.5 119.37
SOCR 27 20-Jul-09 31-Jul-12 1107 3.033 369.9 121.96
SOCR 28 20-Jul-09 31-Jul-12 1107 3.033 647.4 213.46
SOCR 29 18-Dec-09 31-Jul-12 956 2.619 385.3 147.11
SOCR 30 12-Feb-10 31-Jul-12 900 2.466 496.6 201.40
SOCR 31 2-Jul-10 31-Jul-12 760 2.082 428.7 205.89
SOCR 32 2-Jul-10 31-Jul-12 760 2.082 297.5 142.88
SOCR 33 19-Nov-10 31-Jul-12 620 1.699 402.1 236.72
SOCR 34 19-Nov-10 31-Jul-12 620 1.699 448 263.74
SOCR 35 15-Apr-11 31-Jul-12 473 1.296 325.1 250.87
SOCR 36 15-Apr-11 31-Jul-12 473 1.296 238.8 184.27
SOCR 37 26-Aug-11 31-Jul-12 340 0.932 174 186.79
SOCR 38 26-Aug-11 31-Jul-12 340 0.932 166.3 178.53
SOCR 39 20-Jan-12 31-Jul-12 193 0.529 41.4 78.30
SOCR 40 20-Jan-12 31-Jul-12 193 0.529 41.7 78.86







Min 58.04  
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a. Total Time: Average Sailing Hours per Craft per Year 
To calculate the average annual operating hours for each craft, we used 
SBT-22’s engine hour report, which showed the number of hours per engine per craft on 
July 31, 2012.  Because each craft has two engines, we were able to approximate the 
hours of use for the craft based on the engine with the most hours.  Even if one of the 
engines was replaced, it would be evident through a large differential in recorded hours 
for the craft.  We assumed that boat usage was based on a normal distribution, so we 
were able to find the average hours of use and the standard deviation.  To ensure none of 
the craft were outliers, we used the boxplot method of determination.  In this 
determination, the top and bottom quartile of engine hours use are calculated.  The 
difference between these two quartiles is the inter-quartile range which we calculated at 
about 75.7 hours.  We set our threshold for a minor outlier at 1.5 times the inter-quartile 
range added to the median and a major outlier at 3 times the inter-quartile range added to 
the median.  This meant that any craft with engine hours greater than 285.3 hours or a 
lower than 58 hours annually would be treated as a minor outlier and any craft with over 
398.9 hours would be a major outlier.  One of the craft fell outside this range and it is 
considered a minor outlier.  Since only one of the craft was in the minor outlier range, 
and none of the craft were in the major outlier range of three times the inter-quartile 
range, we determined that all craft engine hour usage was representative of the SOCR 
population and accepted them in the determination of average engine hour usage. 
In order to standardize our units of measurement for operational 
availability, we used engine hours.  For example, we converted time into operational 
hours by dividing annual hours by the number of time units in a year (i.e., weekly hours 
would be expressed as annual hours divided by 52). 
b. Operation Availability 
From Special Operations Craft Riverine (SOCR) Quarterly Program 
Management Review & Configuration Control Board, 11 February 2008, (USMI, 2008) 
we were given readiness data for 20 SOCR from April 2005 to June 2008.  This report set 
the operating availability at 89.5% for all craft. 
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Since this operational availability was based on all craft currently in 
service beginning with each craft’s in-service date, we accepted it as a representative 
sample of the distribution of craft we would find at any given time in the fleet.  This 
percentage would not be accurate if it were based on only craft recently fielded or craft 
that were about to be decommissioned because it would bias to one of the extremes of the 
SOCR’s useful service life. 
c. PM Downtime 
From our interviews with the government representative at USMI, we 
knew that the semiannual scheduled PM takes place about seven days twice a year.  In 
addition, we observed that USMI maintenance periods are most commonly in multiples 
of seven days, which is indicative of a weekly cycle time.  For this reason, we normalize 
operational hours to weeks: 
166 Annual HoursWeekly Operating Hours: 3.19 Hours
52 Weeks
=  
          (10) 
 
Equation 10 indicates that the duration of each scheduled semiannual PM 
(one week) is equivalent to 3.19 operational hours, for a total of 6.38 operational hours 
annually for both scheduled PMs. 
In addition, SLEP maintenance is done once between years three and four 
of the SOCR lifecycle and takes 60 days on average; however, SLEP displaces one of the 
scheduled semiannual PMs so it accounts for an additional 53 days of maintenance over 
seven years of useful craft life.  The number of hours of SLEP maintenance per year is 
therefore 53 days divided by seven years, which gives 7.57 days annually, which is 
equivalent to 3.45 operating hours: 
7.56SLEP Hrs =  3.19 = 3.45 Hrs
7
×  (11) 
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By including SLEP maintenance downtime in PM downtime, the 
following number of hours of total PM downtime, in terms of loss of operating hours, per 
year is  
 
Total PM = SLEP + Semi Annual PM => 3.45 + 6.38 = 9.84 (operating hours)  
 (12) 
d. CM Downtime 
Because our data gave us actual numbers for all elements of our 
operational availability equation except for CM, we plugged in all our calculated 
numbers and solved for CM.  To calculate CM downtime, we used the AO formula 
discussed previously.  Subsequently, we calculated total time and PM downtime, which 
gave us the following equation: 
  or  CM=o o
TOT PM CMA TOT PM A TOT
TOT
− −
= − − ×   (13) 
Therefore: 
166 9.84 .895 166 7.59 HrsCM = − − × =  (14) 
When 7.59 operational hours were normalized to weeks, we found that each craft spends 
2.38 weeks in the CM cycle.   
Further, we analyzed the components of the CM downtime.  The CM 
downtime is a function of total failures and the average repair time of these failures.  The 
repair time, or turnaround time, is based on the actual repair time and ALDT in terms of 
spares availability.  Spares availability is expressed in terms of service level, and for the 
SOCR, an objective service level is established in the life cycle sustainment management 
plan as 95% for repair parts with an objective lead-time of five days for parts not on 
hand.  USMI has the responsibility of maintaining inventories of repair parts and ensuring 
that appropriate lead-times are maintained.  If parts are on hand, the cycle-time for CM is 
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estimated at seven days.  Converting these numbers in terms of operating hours, we found 
the following for CM average repair time and supply lead-time: 
Days of MaintOp Hrs lost to CM =  Weekly Op Hrs
 in a WeekDays
×  (15) 
 7: 3.19 3.19 Operating Hours
7
Therefore × =  
Days lead timeSupply Leadtime =  Weekly Op Hrs
Days in a week
×  (16) 
 5: 3.19 2.28 Operating Hours
7
Therefor × =  
To calculate the number of failures per craft per year—called F in Equation 17—
we used the following equation: 
(( ) (( ) )))h s h nH F CM P S CM P= × × + + ×  (17) 
H: operating hours 
F: number of failures 
CMh: operating hours lost to CM 
Ps: probability of part in stock 
Pn: probability of part not in stock 
S: supply lead-time 
 
: 7.59 ((3.19 0.95) ((2.28 3.19) .05)))Therefore F= × × + + ×  (18) 
Solving for F gives 2.29 failures per craft per year. 
e. Full-Mission-Capable Rate 
The full-mission-capable (FMC) rate tells how many craft are available on 
average for any given time and is a function of the number of craft possessed and 
operational availability: 
 number of craft  operational availabilityFMC = ×  (19) 
In our case, the FMC is therefore as follows: 24 x 89.5% = 21.5 craft.  In other words, 2.5 
SOCR are not available at any given time, on average.  Since operational requirements 
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only require 20 full-mission-capable craft, SBT-22 is maintaining greater than 100% of 
their operational requirement. 
4. What-If Analysis Scenarios for the SOCR 
We conducted a simulation in order to model the effects of variation in boat usage 
based on operational hours.  In order to model operating-hour variation, we needed to 
hold constant the parameters affected by operating hours.   
a. Preventive Maintenance 
Because PM takes one week to complete and is done every six months, it 
has an impact on the number of operational hours that the craft is available.  If the 
average operational hours of use rises, then the operational hours lost during the two 
weeks of PM will rise.  In addition, PM time is scheduled for 14 days; however, there are 
times when the SOCR are sent to USMI for PM and the craft remain at USMI for more 
time than expected.  The reason for this variation is CM that is discovered during the PM.  
Based on data and interviews at USMI, we felt that we could make the assumption that 
scheduled PM does not have significant variation; rather, it is the CM component that 
creates variation in turnaround time. 
b. Service Life Extension Program 
SLEP takes 60 days to complete and is completed at USMI on the same 
manufacturing floor as new craft.  We did not model a distribution for SLEP and assumed 
there is no variation.  Since SLEP is conducted once during the useful life of the craft, we 
spread the SLEP downtime across the seven years of useful life for the craft.  SLEP also 
displaces one of the semiannual PMs.  For this reason, we divided 53 days of additional 
downtime by seven years to find that SLEP accounts for 1.08 additional weeks of 
downtime. 
c. Corrective Maintenance 
We assumed a direct relationship between operating hours and CM.  We 
calculated the CM based on the difference between the realized operational readiness and 
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the operational readiness that would have been reported if only PM had been conducted.  
We then fixed this ratio of CM tasks and operational hours of use by dividing the number 
of CM failures per year by the average operational hours in a year.  We then multiplied 
this ratio against the simulated operational hours to model the number of CM jobs 
expected for each simulation year. 
If the SOCR program is running as designed, we estimated a repair 
turnaround time of seven days when parts are on hand and twelve days when parts are not 
on hand.  This estimation gave us a weighted average of 1.03 weeks of turnaround time 
for CM.  By multiplying this turnaround time by the number of simulated CM repairs, we 
found the expected total CM downtime for each simulation year. 
d. Simulation Results 
Using the PM, SLEP, CM, and operational hours parameters, we created a 
distribution of expected AO by using Monte Carlo simulation with software Crystal Ball.  
With a 95% certainty, AO was greater than 87.1% (see Figure 6).  This means that 20.9 
SOCR will be operational at least 95% of the time. 
 
Figure 6.   Operational Readiness 
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Since the SOCR program was designed for 20 operational craft, the AO 
exceeds program requirements and there is less than a 0.01% chance that fewer than 20 
operational craft will be available (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7.   Full Mission Capable 
 
The number of repairs that can be expected will also vary.  This is because 
operational hours have a direct relationship on CM.  Based on our simulation, we found 
that the expected number of repairs per year was 3.49 or less for any given craft in the 
SOCR inventory given a 95% confidence interval (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.   Number of Expected Repairs 
 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have used the data we collected to analyze the SBS and DDPs 
ability to provide spare parts for required maintenance in order to reduce the 
administrative down time associated with ordering parts.  We looked at the service level 
currently provided by the pre-staged inventories and created a model to enable decision- 
makers to plan on-hand quantities required to meet their desired service level.  In the next 
section, we will make recommendations for improvements in the SBS and DDPs based 
on the model we developed. 
We also analyzed the operational readiness of SOCR.  This analysis enabled us to 
simulated changes in the parameters affecting operational readiness.  Through this 
analysis and simulation, we will make recommendations which management can consider 
for attaining the highest operational readiness at the most economic cost. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SBS AND DDP SERVICE LEVELS 
The SBS and DDP are both pre-staged inventories that serve the purpose of 
decreasing administrative downtime for SOCR requiring maintenance.  They do this 
through maintaining a protective inventory for parts.  By making a determination on what 
AO is required for the craft supported by these inventories, SBT-22 managers can use the 
model presented in Chapter IV of this report to hold the AO constant while making 
adjustments to the quantities of parts maintained in the SBS and DDPs. 
Because maintenance repairs often require a variety of repair parts, maintenance 
managers will need to make a determination on what critical maintenance jobs will be 
necessary to keep the SOCR operational.  A critical maintenance job is any PM or CM 
job that will prevent the operational use of the SOCR.  Each of the parts needed to 
complete these jobs needs to be identified by maintenance personnel; this listing of parts 
will be classified as a parts kit.  With our current data, we did not have the ability to 
calculate the average occurrence for these jobs; however, once the job kits needed for 
critical maintenance are identified, the protection level for each of the parts contained in 
the job can be used to indicate the current protection level for the kit given the SBS and 
DDP inventories. 
Further research will be useful for determining a more accurate estimate of 
average occurrence for critical maintenance jobs.  By developing a history of completed 
jobs, orders for parts not required in critical maintenance will be identified as well as the 
identification of parts used in critical maintenance jobs but that were ordered 
independently of a critical maintenance job. 
These recommendations will not change the concept of the SBS and DDP but will 
enable managers to quantify the impact that decisions will have on inventory protection 
levels and readiness. 
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B. AVAILABILITY 
Based on the data we collected, we were given the availability of the SOCR.  In 
this report, we used the data to separate that availability into its components and estimate 
how much each component contributed to the system availability.  Once management at 
SBT-22 makes a determination on what the desired availability target should be, 
decisions affecting the components of availability can be made to achieve that desired 
availability level. 
1. Service Life Extension Program 
SLEP is the largest contributor to the reduction in availability.  Because SLEP is a 
PM function, there is an inherent relationship with CM.  In order for SLEP to be worth 
doing, it must reduce CM downtime by at least the same amount of time that it takes to 
complete SLEP.  In the case of the SOCR, this would mean reducing annual maintenance 
by almost exactly one extra week of CM annually per craft, which is equivalent to about 
one additional CM job annually. 
In addition to the impact that SLEP has on availability, SLEP should be 
considered in terms of cost.  Currently, a new SOCR with all engineering changes costs 
$1,365,155 to replace and SLEP costs about $200,000.  Based on the cost of the craft and 
the expected hours of use, we found that the cost of each operational hour is about 
$1,175.  By using this cost per operational hour, we found that each craft’s life must be 
extended by about 170 operational hours for SLEP to be effective; we can expect SBT-22 
to accumulate this many hours in just over one year.  SLEP is only cost effective if it 
extends the life of the craft by greater than one year.  
Under the current procurement schedule, four craft per year were delivered over 
12 years.  Only 24 craft were authorized.  This means that the authorized craft limit was 
achieved in six years.  In order to maintain 24 craft, SBT-22 had to dispose of excess 
craft when new craft were delivered, which resulted in a six-year effective life.  As a 
result, the oldest craft in service as of July 2012 is only 5.46 years old.  USMI has 
specified a seven-year service life for their craft when a SLEP is conducted; therefore, we 
can see that SBT-22 does not get the benefit of the full service life of the craft.  In fact, 
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the data we collected indicates that disposing of craft based on the established 
procurement schedule actually reduces the useful life that SBT-22 gets out of their SOCR 
by at least one year. 
2. Scheduled Maintenance 
Currently, SOCR PM checks and services are scheduled every six months.  They 
are conducted regardless of the number of operational hours that the craft is used. 
For components that give an indication of wear prior to failure or are of low 
criticality, conducting checks is an economical way of maintaining a high readiness level.  
This process is referred to as conditions based maintenance (CBM) (Golmakani, 2012).  
An example of a PM item for which a CBM check would be appropriate could be a load 
test on an alternator.  Rather than automatically servicing or replacing an alternator, 
which is an expensive repairable component, a load test would indicate if an alternator 
has decreased voltage output, which indicates that it will fail soon.  Either an inspection 
can be performed manually during scheduled checks and service intervals, or they can be 
built into the system through sensors, which indicate when conditions have been met that 
requires maintenance activities.  CBM enables maintainers either to detect defective 
components prior to failure or anticipate failure based on the increased risk as known 
conditions are met (Golmakani, 2012). 
Services are conducted during the PM cycle regardless of the condition of the 
craft.  For parts or materials that fail often, are inexpensive, are easy to replace, do not 
give indications that they will fail soon, have a predictable failure pattern, or are of high 
criticality, a service may be more economical.  An example of a part that would be 
serviced could be a thermostat.  Because a thermostat gives no indication it is about to 
fail, and when it does fail, causes the engine to overheat and become inoperable, it may 
be more economical to replace it during scheduled service rather than run it to failure. 
Many checks are easily conducted, and those that require a lot of disassembly 
oftentimes are better completed with a service.  Even if some checks are done more often 
than needed, because they are easily completed, it is still economical.  The decision to 
accomplish an unneeded PM task should be cautiously considered and analyzed from the 
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perspective of risk of accidental damage from the maintenance action itself.  For this 
reason, a calendar-based schedule is appropriate for many checks, but would deserve 
analysis of the checks being performed to determine if there is a risk of generating more 
maintenance requirements through accidental damage.  Since SBT-22 has mechanics that 
are capable of all operational levels of maintenance on the SOCR, we recommend that 
these checks and any associated maintenance service as a result of conditions discovered 
during the checks should be conducted on their current schedule by SBT-22. 
Many services for the SOCR are based on the wear that is put on the craft in terms 
of operating hours.  With the current contract-based PM schedule, these services are 
conducted regardless of the operational hours, resulting in some unnecessary 
maintenance.  We recommend that maintenance personnel at SBT-22 review the current 
maintenance schedule to determine which maintenance tasks could be converted to an 
operational hours–based schedule.  This may result in less cost in maintenance and a 
higher operational readiness level. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Both the SOCR and RAB are manufactured by USMI and are almost identical in 
logistics support requirements.  The RAB is not supported with a logistics support 
agreement with USMI.  Further research could be focused on integration of best practices 
from both logistics support structures to better support both craft.  This could result in 
further efficiencies because of standardization of procedures or spare parts as well as 
pooling of spares. 
With the SOCR program approaching its end, a next generation of riverine craft 
will need to be procured.  Further research might look at the best practices from the 
SOCR and areas for improvement in order to help develop a program with an efficient 
life cycle cost, specifically when it comes to operating costs. 
With the data we collected, we were able to calculate and model availability for 
the SOCR.  Availability indicates an expected percentage of craft that will be available at 
any given point in time.  Reliability indicates the probability of availability over time.  
For example, reliability will indicate what percentage of craft will stay operational over a 
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defined time period for a mission.  In order to determine reliability, data would have to be 
collected for overall craft failure rates.  Maintenance tasks would need to be analyzed to 
determine what tasks are truly critical and which maintenance tasks are PM or minor 
repairs. 
Finally, the SOCR model is not exclusive to this program.  Further research could 
identify other low-density items and apply best practices from the SOCR program. 
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APPENDIX.  SOCR SPARES MODEL 
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233-7658 PLATE, 01-42443 EA 18.60$             80 4 1 3.33 0.42 99.59 0.01004 0.82 3 99.84% 55.80$         74.40$        1.37 3 60.23%
233-7657 COVER, 01-46285 EA 37.90$             74 4 1 3.08 0.39 107.66 0.00929 0.76 2 99.89% 75.80$         151.60$     1.27 2 63.85% 75.80$              37.90$                 
233-7695 CAM EA 67.50$             71 4 1 2.96 0.37 112.21 0.00891 0.73 2 99.91% 135.00$       270.00$     1.22 2 65.69% 135.00$            67.50$                 
311-7098 TERMINAL, NON-INSULATED BUTT, 14-BUTT (100/PK) EA 0.14$                100 12 2 4.17 0.52 79.67 0.01255 1.03 3 100.00% 0.42$           1.67$          1.71 3 75.40% 0.42$                 0.28$                   
313-7056 BATTERY, DEEP CYCLE, 12V LEAD ACID EA 210.09$           80 4 2 3.33 0.42 99.59 0.01004 0.82 3 99.84% 630.27$       840.36$     1.37 3 84.07% 630.27$            420.18$               
313-7023 BATTERY, CRANKING, 12V EA 153.95$           58 4 2 2.42 0.30 137.36 0.00728 0.60 2 99.96% 307.90$       615.80$     0.99 2 92.10% 307.90$            307.90$               
247-7094 SEAL, JWKZADF/201499 EA 63.11$             26 2 1 1.08 0.14 306.42 0.00326 0.27 1 99.74% 63.11$         126.22$     0.45 1 92.59% 63.11$              63.11$                 
854-7295 SEAL, GREASE UNITIZED (HD TRL) EA 38.45$             177 6 6 7.38 0.92 45.01 0.02222 1.82 4 99.73% 153.80$       230.70$     3.03 5 96.49% 192.25$            230.70$               
256-4513 GASKET, STRAINER TOP CAP, 3/16"THK, 70 DURO NEOPR EA 7.00$                38 2 2 1.58 0.20 209.65 0.00477 0.39 2 99.26% 14.00$         14.00$        0.65 1 97.16% 7.00$                 14.00$                 
247-7206 KIT, TAIL PIPE EA 5,075.30$       15 1 1 0.63 0.08 531.12 0.00188 0.15 1 98.93% 5,075.30$   5,075.30$  0.26 1 97.22% 5,075.30$        5,075.30$           
512-7093 FILTER, STRAIGHT AIR, 7.5" X 5" EA 119.18$           93 2 4 3.88 0.48 85.66 0.01167 0.96 3 92.77% 357.54$       238.36$     1.59 3 97.67% 357.54$            476.72$               
264-7003 ELEMENT, REPLACEMENT, AQUABLOC (FOR 500MA30) EA 7.53$                92 8 4 3.83 0.48 86.60 0.01155 0.95 3 100.00% 22.59$         60.24$        1.58 3 97.77% 22.59$              30.12$                 
233-7644 V-BELT, ALTERNATOR EA 18.89$             31 2 2 1.29 0.16 256.99 0.00389 0.32 1 99.58% 18.89$         37.78$        0.53 1 98.32% 18.89$              37.78$                 
247-7155 SEAL, HJ 291 WATER EA 883.85$           11 1 1 0.46 0.06 724.26 0.00138 0.11 1 99.41% 883.85$       883.85$     0.19 1 98.43% 883.85$            883.85$               
303-7027 CIRCUIT BREAKER, W31 SERIES, 15AMP TOGGLE-ACTUATED EA 27.82$             11 2 1 0.46 0.06 724.26 0.00138 0.11 1 99.98% 27.82$         55.64$        0.19 1 98.43% 27.82$              27.82$                 
504-7131 PYROMETER, DUAL, 2" 300-1700 LOW BLACK BEZEL HEAD EA 97.82$             11 2 1 0.46 0.06 724.26 0.00138 0.11 1 99.98% 97.82$         195.64$     0.19 1 98.43% 97.82$              97.82$                 
233-7659 O-RING, 05-06-537 EA 1.73$                10 1 0.42 0.05 796.68 0.00126 0.10 1 No Protection 1.73$           -$            0.17 1 98.69% 1.73$                 1.73$                   
074-7009 PLUNGER, SPRING, SS 5/8"-1TH LOCKING NOSE L-HANDLE EA 36.66$             9 4 1 0.38 0.05 885.20 0.00113 0.09 1 100.00% 36.66$         146.64$     0.15 0 98.93% -$                   36.66$                 
311-7046 SWITCH, TOGGLE MINIATURE, 5A AT 125VAC ON-ON SPDT EA 5.25$                8 8 1 0.33 0.04 995.85 0.00100 0.08 1 100.00% 5.25$           42.00$        0.14 0 99.14% -$                   5.25$                   
504-7002 GAUGE, ELECTRONC BLK, 100-250F WATER/GEAR OIL TEMP EA 25.04$             8 2 1 0.33 0.04 995.85 0.00100 0.08 1 99.99% 25.04$         50.08$        0.14 0 99.14% -$                   25.04$                 
854-7076 PLUG, ELECTRIC, 6-PIN EA 12.39$             2 1 0.08 0.01 3983.40 0.00025 0.02 0 None -$             -$            0.03 0 99.94% -$                   12.39$                 
247-7109 BEARING, JNODAEV/201447H EA 409.42$           7 1 1 0.29 0.04 1138.12 0.00088 0.07 1 99.75% 409.42$       409.42$     0.12 0 99.34% -$                   409.42$               
247-7091 SCREEN, INTAKE EA 1,477.76$       21 2 2 0.88 0.11 379.37 0.00264 0.22 1 99.86% 1,477.76$   2,955.52$  0.36 1 99.41% 1,477.76$        2,955.52$           
233-7313 GASKET, EXHAUST EA 6.02$                6 4 1 0.25 0.03 1327.80 0.00075 0.06 1 100.00% 6.02$           24.08$        0.10 0 99.51% -$                   6.02$                   
247-7097 O-RING, HAMILTION HJ292 WATERJET, TRANSOM EA 15.90$             6 2 1 0.25 0.03 1327.80 0.00075 0.06 1 100.00% 15.90$         31.80$        0.10 0 99.51% -$                   15.90$                 
504-7016 INDICATOR, FUEL LEVEL, 2-TANK TENDER SYSTEM EA 398.89$           6 1 0.25 0.03 1327.80 0.00075 0.06 1 No Protection 398.89$       -$            0.10 0 99.51% -$                   398.89$               
613-7325 ROPE, DOUBLE-BRAIDED NYLON 3/16" X 150' BLACK EA 49.26$             6 1 0.25 0.03 1327.80 0.00075 0.06 1 No Protection 49.26$         -$            0.10 0 99.51% -$                   49.26$                 
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